Belarusian Identity and its Distortions v3.0

© 2022

Prologue

Imagine an Indian reservation circa 1910, somewhere in the American west.  The Native Americans are milling around, attending to their daily business, trying to keep a society that is their own in a certain place.  A bunch of educated white men show up on horses and in cars.  We can imagine that these people are not particularly hostile.  They do not engage in violence, theft, or verbal abuse.  In fact, they seem respectful and considerate.  Instead they show smiles, and perhaps even distribute a few gifts.  After short exchanges it is clear that the whites know the language of the natives.  They distribute poetry and short stories in this language and begin to instruct the natives about their own culture.  They lecture them on their “true” identity and go as far as to correct the grammar of their speech.  Among the exchanges, the whites advise the natives on what political orientation to have.

This scene is similar to the Northwestern Krai of Russia in the 19^th century.  The educated men showing up to teach the natives, are a metaphor for upper class Poles.  The natives – a metaphor for the people that were then “Ruskie,” and now, “Belarusians.”

The essay that follows is intended to bring balance to the divergent views of Belarusian history and identity.  One side seems to dominate most available media on this topic, particularly within the English language space.  This obviously poses a major problem for Belarus as well as anyone interested in it, since English has emerged as the lingua franca of international academia.  This essay seeks to outline objective historical facts pertinent to the topic of Belarusian identity, as well as to show the opposing side of the argument over identity in Belarus; an argument that itself goes unnoticed by many people (both in Belarus and abroad) who know only of the existence of one side of that argument.  Furthermore, this essay is focused on the long-term issues of identity and does not discuss current political happenings.  It is the opposite of knee-jerk thinking, or short-term political actions. 

Introduction: The situation of Belarusian identity

The history of Belarus is arguably much more complicated than that of other European countries.  There are numerous articles and online videos discussing this history, most of which do not take an objective position.  Rather, they talk about Belarus in romantic, nationalist terms and according to narratives popular particularly among patriotic Poles and Lithuanians to this day.  Most online sources are put out by individuals and groups that are selling a specific idea about Belarusian identity.  For this reason, many of these media sources neatly package their narrative so that it is quickly communicated to a general public with the contemporary three-minute attention span that is so common in the age of smart phones.  Many activist groups attempt to use the internet to garner western support for their movements within Belarus.  There is a noticeable overrepresentation of the Polish/Lithuanian position on Belarusian identity in mass media today, particularly in the English language information space. 

In the 19^th century, the Polish upper class in what is now Belarus went to work creating a national identity for the Belarusians.  This was after the Poles’ realm was partitioned between Russia, Prussia, and Austria.  Their former subjects had a reputation for lacking enthusiasm toward political talk as well as nationalisms.  These people who composed a peasant class in what is now Belarus were called “Rus” or “Rusi” or “Rusini.”  They had a separate heritage in Kievan Rus and were recognized as a separate nationality within the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth, insofar as nationality was understood at that point in history.

What follows is an in-depth analysis and discussion of Belarusian identity that takes a different perspective from most of the information that is readily available on the topic of Belarus.  This essay includes not only historical and background information but discusses the possibilities for the future of the Belarusian people.  Given the over representation of certain narratives in mass media regarding Belarus, it is important to understand what it means to be Belarusian and to obtain a balanced view of the various narratives about Belarus.

From here on out the following term is used: Litvin nationalism: Another term for the predominant form of Belarusian nationalism seen today.  It specifically refers to the tendency of this particular nationalism to place emphasis on a positive view of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania’s historical rule of Belarus, and, one could say, that it hinges on that rule, being a direct consequence of it.  This essay discusses how the most predominant form of Belarusian nationalism – the one that we see most often in mass media – is actually not very Belarusian.  From here on out the term “Belarusian” refers to the group of people descended from the traditional East Slavic inhabitants of Belarus, and excludes other ethnicities such as Poles and Lithuanians who happen to live there. 

Another term used from here on out: Muscovy: A term referring to the people and government associated with the historic Grand Duchy, and later Tsardom, of Moscow, also known as “Great Russians.”  Technically, other polities existed alongside Muscovy for a time, for example: Novgorod and Suzdal.  However, these other regions eventually became part of Muscovy, and are part of today’s Russian Federation. 

The Basic Chronology of the Belarusian situation

It is true that we do not live in the past, but an understanding of Belarus’s history is critical to understanding its culture and what is important for Belarus now.  The following abbreviated history serves as a necessary introduction.  Every effort has been made to present the information objectively and matter-of-factly.

The first recognizable ancestors of Belarusians on the territory of present day Belarus were Eastern Slavs.  There were multiple tribes of these Slavs spanning a broad area.  The Eastern Slavs suffered from disorganization and general barbarism like many peoples of Europe at the time.  After accepting Scandinavian nobles as their new rulers, these Eastern Slavs came to be known as the “Rus” in their own language as well as others.  The Byzantines called them “Ros” and their land “Rosia” which is the basic etymology of the modern name of “Rossiya” which is how one says “Russia” in Russian.

Novgorod and Kiev figured prominently in this forming nation.  Rurik, the famous Scandinavian prince who is considered to be the first monarch of Rus, founded Novgorod as his capital.  Later the capital was moved to Kiev, and thus began the time period that historians refer to as “Kievan Rus.”  The territory of present day Belarus was one of many regions that were part of this culture.  It is important to understand, though, the decentralized nature of Kievan Rus.  Local princes ruled different principalities, with Novgorod and Kiev serving as capitals in a somewhat confederal sense. 

Kievan Rus converted to Christianity at the time of Prince Vladimir of Kiev, receiving it from the Byzantines.  All of Rus grew in prosperity and expanded eastward.  However, political instability created disunity and weakness.  Rus was a decentralized grouping of city states populated by the same people.  Two centuries after becoming Christianized, the Mongols invaded and decimated Rus.  Belarus was largely untouched, however – leading to the apocryphal story that “Belaya Rus” which means “White Rus” was untouched, pure, saved, whereas the rest of Rus was ravaged.

The trauma of the Mongol invasion weakened Rus further, leading to a division of momentous proportions that would affect Rus from that time until the present day.  The Mongols managed to hold onto the eastern regions of Rus, in present day Novgorod, Tver, Ryazan, Yaroslavl, and Moscow: most of the European portion of the present day Russian Federation.  They were concerned almost exclusively with extracting tribute.

In the west, what is now Belarus and Ukraine were annexed by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during that time of weakness.  At the time, this annexation seemed to be mutually beneficial for the Rus and Lithuanians because they were able to form a military alliance in order to prevent Mongolian expansion.  By the mid 14^th century, Rus was split in two parts: the eastern part which was self-ruled but forced to pay tribute to the Mongols, and the western part which was annexed by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL).  Despite the fact that the local aristocracy remained in place in western Rus to a great extent, Polish culture eventually reigned supreme amongst the aristocracy (which will be discussed in more detail later).  Lithuanians perceived that their culture and language were not as well developed as that of Rus, and to some extent allowed themselves to be Russified, not by some imperial master, but by their vassals – a truly unique situation in history.  They began to use the language of the Rus for governmental and academic activities, what is often referred to now as “Old Ruthenian.”  Also during this period, a divergence began between the vernacular language of Muscovy and that of the Rus within the GDL.  However, there was one language that all of the Rus both in Muscovy and in the GDL used for liturgy and academics that practically did not change: Church Slavonic.

During the entire history of the GDL, the Rus were recognized as a separate people from the Lithuanians.  It was clear on a very practical cultural level that they were a separate ethnos.  The Rus spoke a different language, were Orthodox Christian, had different artistic styles, music; the whole cultural sphere was different.  Today, the idea of self-determination and nation states seems universal.  But in the GDL the Grand Duke was an ethnic Lithuanian that ruled over his own ethnic brethren as well as the Rus. 

There was some level of intermixing of the nobility with the Rus.  For example: Grand Duke Olgerd’s wives were both Rus, one from Vitebsk and the other from Tver.  His sons went on to rule places such as Polotsk, Kopil, and Slutsk in Belarus; Rylsk, Pskov, and Bryansk, in Russia; Kiev, Chortoriisk, Novgorod-Seversky, and Lutsk in Ukraine.  His daughters married princes in Suzdal, Borovsk, and Serpukhov.  The epic Russian poem Zadonshchina of that period also attests to the close relationship of the Rus peoples, including those within the GDL. 

The GDL developed a close relationship with Poland from early on in its history.  The 1385 Union of Krewo is widely seen as a pivotal moment in the history of Lithuania and Poland, which would eventually set up the merger of the two.  This was likely triggered by the regional threat to both states by the Teutonic Knights.  This union was also likely stimulated by Lithuanian fears of the growing power of Moscow, which had defeated the Mongols at Kulikovo in 1380 – a turning point for the Rus in Russophile historiography.  It is noteworthy, however, that princes Andrei and Dmitri from the GDL (sons of Duke Olgerd who had Rus ancestry through their mother)  also participated in the battle, allied with Moscow.  Polish culture became viewed as superior by the aristocracy.  Ethnic Lithuanian and Rus nobles became Polonized as a result.  The process of Polonization was akin to Russification, but deeper in some ways.  The aristocracy began to use the Polish language and converted en masse to Roman Catholicism.  This created a cultural chasm between the rulers and the people.  The peasant class that retained their culture and identity would later become known as the Belarusians and Ukrainians.  The aristocrats were whole or in part ethnic Polish, or in the least, culturally Polish.  This process only accelerated with the creation of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth (PLC) in 1569.  In that year, the Union of Lublin occurred which officially created the new single state of the combined Kingdom of Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 

Belarus had local historical figures such as Frantsisk Skarina (Skorina) who famously translated the Bible into the vernacular language, what today is commonly called “Old Ruthenian.”  This represented an early use of the vernacular language that would become Belarusian.  During a war between the GDL and the Grand Duchy of Muscovy, the Rus noble Konstantin Ostrozhski was the commander of GDL forces.  He is held up by some as a hero and advocate for Belarusian sovereignty, though he did not apparently object to Lithuanian rule, and his military exploits could be compared to those of other Great Russian princes who fought with Muscovy.  He was an ardent supporter of the Orthodox Church in the GDL.  Mikhail Glinsky was a famous GDL political and military figure that staged an uprising against the GDL, siding with Muscovy and helping them to take Smolensk.  His niece, Elena, married Grand Prince Vasili III of Moscow and was the mother of Ivan IV (The Terrible).  She ruled Muscovy as a regent for several years after her husband’s death, making peace and normalizing relations between both grand duchies. 

Portions of the present day Russian Federation were also controlled by the GDL, including prominent cities such as Kursk and Smolensk.  There was, in fact, interplay and exchange between the Rus of the GDL and Muscovy, such as in the life of famed printer Ivan Fedorov.  The strongest institutional link between the Rus in both territories was the Orthodox Church.  The Patriarchate of Constantinople which controlled the church in both countries preferred to treat the territories of the GDL and Muscovy as one space.  The faith tradition of Russian Orthodoxy itself existed long before the Patriarchate of Moscow was established in 1589.  (This will be discussed in more detail later.)  After Muscovy annexed some eastern portions of the GDL during conflicts prior to the actual Partitions of Poland, the Rus that had formerly lived within the GDL figured prominently in Russian history.  This was also true of the rest of the GDL territory even before it was annexed by Muscovy. 

With all institutions and levers of governmental power in the hands of a Polish elite, it was not hard to influence the Orthodox clergy.  The local aristocrats, even if they had ancestry in Kievan Rus, were basically Polish.  In 1589 the Metropolitanate of Moscow was elevated to a Patriarchate, allowing it to operate independent of Constantinople.  The official title of the Patriarch of Moscow was “Patriarch of Moscow and all the Russes (Russias).”  It is no coincidence that in 1596, only seven years later, most of the bishops of the Orthodox Church in the PLC decided to join the Roman Catholic Church, becoming Eastern Catholics or “Uniates.”  This event is known as the Union of Brest.  This union followed the prototype of the Union of Florence of 1439, in which contingents of the Patriarchate of Constantinople joined the Roman Catholic Church as an Eastern-Rite branch.   There were holdouts, however, and the conversion to Uniatism was not total.  The bishops who joined the Unia took their parishes and monasteries with them.  Persecutions of faithful Orthodox followed.  Even one of the most famous statesmen of the PLC, Lev Sepieha, considered the Unia a bad idea and sympathized with the Orthodox.  The Polish estate holders ensured that Uniate clergy were assigned to the formerly Orthodox parishes on their territory.  Orthodox or “Disuniate” holdouts were barred from assignment to parishes. 

After wars with Muscovy, revolts by the Rus subjects, and internal instabilities, the PLC was partitioned between Russia, Prussia, and Austria in a process that ended in 1795.  This brought most of the historical Rus lands into the tsardom.  It was, objectively speaking, a reunification of Rus.  But some questioned the worth of such a reunification, and this question has lead to much disunity and strife in Rus to this very day.  This question of the worth of the reunification is central to both Belarusian and Ukrainian nationalisms.  The Poles and Lithuanians certainly were against it.  The Rus who would become known as Belarusians were by and large indifferent.  They had the reputation among their Polish rulers of being docile and barely interested in nationalisms.  Eastern Catholic (Uniate) Belarusians almost universally converted back to the Orthodox Church of their ancestors by 1840.  Many also began to learn Russian, with little resistance at all.  Like the Lithuanians had adopted their old language centuries before for the sake of commerce and education, Belarusians adopted Russian – the language of Muscovy.  It can be argued that state pressures caused this to happen, but Belarusians by and large did not resist Russification, which will be further discussed later.  Prior to Polish uprisings that would eventually occur, the Russian Empire permitted most of the institutions of the former PLC to remain in place in Belarus, including the 1588 Lithuanian Statutes, and even the Roman Catholic Jesuit order. 

There were several attempts by Poles to revolt against Russia and re-establish the sovereignty of their nation as well as to retake their former vassals, notably in 1796, 1830, and 1863.  Around the time of the 1863 revolt, known as the “January Uprising” elements of the Polish aristocracy began an outreach operation to the Belarusian lower class.  These efforts were primarily in the literary sphere, including Litvin nationalist newspapers such as Commoner’s Truth.  They attempted to form an alternative identity for them, in which Belarus was thought of as a separate nation from Russia.  In their narrative, Belarus has its roots in the GDL, is more brotherly with Lithuania and Poland than with Russia, and is a distinct nation that should not seek unity with Muscovy, which was seen in the Polish narrative as an outgrowth of the Mongol Horde.  The idea of a triune Slavic nation of Rus was fought fiercely by ethnic Poles and Lithuanians, and understandably so.  Among the motives of the Poles was the largely unsuccessful attempt to recruit Belarusians to their militias for the 1863 January Uprising.

Eventually the Russo-Japanese War and World War I significantly weakened the Russian Empire, making it susceptible to revolt, given the decades long presence of liberal and left wing political movements within.  The Bolshevik Revolution and subsequent formation of the USSR caused another development in Belarusian identity.  For a short period of time, nationalists erected a nascent government called the “Belarusian People’s Republic.”  This state was the first state to be created as an explicitly Belarusian one.  As discussed later, there is an argument put forward by some nationalists that Medieval Polotsk was the first, but that city state neither claimed to be “Belarusian” nor did it assert a national identity. 

This small state ended up succumbing to the advance of the Red Army and the re-creation of the Polish nation-state.  The new Soviet Union created a republic called the “Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic,” enshrining Belarusian nationalism as a valued institution.  However, at the formation of the BSSR there were at least two local Soviets (councils in Vitebsk and Mogilev) in which the existence of a Belarusian nation was questioned.  In fact there was little popular support at the time for the formation of the political entity of “Belarus.”  For some time, the USSR supported the development of Belarusian nationalism and language as part of its policies of “Korenization” (“Indigenization”).  A central component of Soviet ideology was the idea that the workers of the world were uniting – putting aside nationalisms for the sake of Marxism.  In order to make their arguments carry more weight, the Soviets considered the USSR to be a grouping of separate nations, which was certainly true in the case of Russia versus Kazakhstan, or Georgia versus Armenia.  But they supported the idea that originated with the Poles, that Belarus was a completely separate nation from Muscovy.  Any loyalties and sympathies for local Belarusian nationalists were short lived, however.  Like all strata of Soviet society, when their usefulness had been exploited, they were dispatched.  During the Stalinist purges, Belarusian nationalist leaders were massacred or sent to gulags.  The memory of these repressions is reiterated and amplified by Litvin nationalists, and the role of the Soviet government in promoting Belarusian nationalism prior to World War II is mostly forgotten.

During World War II, Belarus suffered heavily.  Most of the population did not collaborate with the Nazis, and Belarus was known as the center of the partisan movement – the resistance militias that covertly fought the Nazis.  Belarus was rebuilt after the war and emerged as an industrial center of the USSR.  When the USSR began to fall apart, nationalists, among others, took the opportunity to seize power in Belarus and ensured that it became an independent state.  After that, a complicated political struggle ensued between a hardcore nationalist fringe, pro-western liberals, and Post-Soviet Nomenclatura.

For the purposes of this essay, this chronology is abbreviated and stops at this point.  By studying the history of Belarus, one can see the comparison of it with its neighbors.  Both pro-Russian forces and Litvin nationalists alike will often go deep into history to make their arguments, and make accusations against each other of being overly speculative and theoretical because of it.  Certainly we do not live in the past.  However, the past holds the key to understanding identity, which exists before any actions that a human being makes in the present. 

Throughout history, Belarus was distinct from Poland and Lithuania, but not so much from Russia.  While no one can deny that Belarus has a separate history from the Russian Federation, being in the GDL, PLC, and developing a separate language, one must “go out on a limb” so to speak in order to deny the connection with Russia.

As previously mentioned, Belarusians were not isolated from Muscovite/Great Russian history.  One of the most Tsarist, pro-Muscovite works of art ever created was composed by a man who could be described as a “Belarusian” by the definition of that term as held by Litvin nationalists themselves: Mikhail Glinka, from Smolensk.  Glinka wrote the opera “A Life For The Tsar” which takes place during a major war with the PLC during the Time of Troubles, in which an attempt was made to incorporate Moscow into the Commonwealth.  It is an opera about how a peasant man sacrifices himself to save the new Tsar Mikhail Romanov.  Glinka’s ancestors had been nobles within the PLC.  Similarly, the priestmonk Simeon of Polotsk was a key figure who participated in the historic council of Moscow in 1666.  He also was a proponent of early Russian/Muscovite nationalism.  Fyodor Dostoyevsky, who is arguably one of the top three Russian literary minds had lineage in the GDL, his surname being taken from the village of Dostoevo near Pinsk.  Panteleimon Nizhnik was from Grodno – probably the most Polishly influenced region of Belarus – yet he went on to found and shape Holy Trinity Monastery in Jordanville, New York.  This monastery was a center for Russian Emigres, particularly hard core Tsarists and Civil War veterans of the defeated White Army.  There are countless other historical figures with origins in the lands of the GDL who had a significant impact on Russian/Muscovite history, such as Dimitry of Rostov, Theophan Prokopovich, Stefan Yavorsky, Piotr Tchaikovsky, Igor Sikorsky,and Dmitry Bortniansky.

Throughout Europe, architecture serves as a clear artistic medium for communicating heritage.  Among the various types of architecture that have been preserved over the ages, churches and cathedrals are some of the most memorable and commonly cited.  Church architecture in Belarus shows the different time periods with their styles and influences.  The earliest (Orthodox) churches in Belarus were identical in style to those built throughout the rest of Rus, including the lands around Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov and other areas.  The Monastery Church of the Transfiguration in Polotsk and the Church of Saints Boris and Gleb in Grodno are clear examples of this.  The Church of Holy Wisdom in Polotsk, which was heavily modified by Polish authorities and currently bares no resemblance to its original form, was very similar to the Church of Holy Wisdom in Kiev.  As time went on, Polish and other western influences lead to the development of the “Belarusian Gothic” style of architecture, which lead to the construction of a handful of unique Orthodox churches during a brief time period prior to the Union of Brest.  As time went on, old churches were repaired and remodeled and lost their original styles, taking on a more Polish character due to the supply of engineers and builders in the GDL and PLC.  As the aristocracy became Polonized, they built more Latin Rite Roman Catholic Churches throughout Belarus, while the peasants maintained more rustic and decrepit Orthodox ones.  After the Union of Brest, more Polish/western style church architecture prevailed.  After the partitions of Poland, the architectural style of Orthodox churches in Belarus became much closer to what had been normative prior to Polish influence. 

Traditional coral folk music in Belarus is virtually identical to that found throughout the rest of Rus.  There is virtually no difference between the older coral music found in the Russian Federation, preserved in remote places and by groups such as the Old Believers, and that found in Belarus from the same time period.  The older style of music with its ancient type of harmonization and its wailing character, sounds alien to the modern ear versed in the classical music of the last 300 years, and the music of countries bordering Rus.  Songs popular among Litvin nationalists such as Yuriya are stylistically identical to the music found in the rest of Rus.  Modern folk music in Belarus is also incredibly similar to that found in Russia and Ukraine, more than it is to that found in Poland.  A good example of this is the popular song Kupalinka.  There is also a genre of modern Belarusian folk music popular with Litvin nationalists, that seeks to reconstruct ancient music in Belarus – particularly the GDL period – despite discontinuity with its actual model. 

Traditional clothing in Belarus follows patterns based in old Kievan Rus.  The embroidery patterns are of a style particular to Rus.  The men’s costume is dominated by a large shirt, usually with a belt over it, exactly like what is found in Russia and Ukraine.  These shirts typically have a more prominent embroidered pattern near the collar compared to those found in Russia, and this is their distinguishing regional feature.  Sometimes a long coat is present, similar to coats found historically in Poland and Russia.  The women’s costume is characterized by the same type of embroidered patterns on the shirt.  The women wear wreaths of flowers or large, drooping, cloth head scarves, which differ in style from those found in both Polish and Russian women’s clothing.  They typically wear a vest identical to that found in Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania.  An embroidered apron or towel is worn over the front of the skirt similar to what is worn in Ukraine and Poland, though this towel is decorated with unique embroidery.  A unique cylindrical hat is also common in the women’s costume, though a similar hat can be found in the Urals and among Tatars.  For everyday use in the past – and in churches today – women wear thin, light head scarves identical to those found in Russia and Ukraine. 

On Polotsk and old Rus

There is an argument that was and continues to be put forward by Poles, Lithuanians, and some Litvin nationalists that the Principality of Polotsk was somehow separate from Rus, had what is akin to a national independence, and from its very inception, was a non-Rus entity.  Call this theoretical entity “Polotskia” or “Dregovichia” or whatever you may.  This is an incredibly difficult argument to make, since it is based on splitting the hairs of politics more than objective studies of ethnography.  The culture of Polotsk was certainly that of Rus. 

Another reason why the Polotskian Proto-Belarusian argument is difficult to make is the fact that so many other principalities of Rus had political disagreements and division.  The process of political succession, or transfer of power, was complex and generated political instability during the period of Kievan Rus.  Polotsk was really no different than other principalities that often shed each other’s blood.  One need look no further than the histories of Moscow, Novgorod, and Suzdal to see an architype of division in Rus.  Today, no one claims that Novgorod and Suzdal are not “Russian” because of their past principality wars.  The pseudo independence of theoretical “Polotskia” is on par with the divisions between the Great Russian cities in what is now the Russian Federation.

An anecdote about division and the shedding of blood in Rus can be found in the namesake of one of the oldest extant churches in Belarus.  The “Kalozha” church in Grodno is named for Saints Boris and Gleb – two pious, princely, Kievan brothers who were slain by their impious brother who sought political power.  Every serious historian of Kievan Rus, regardless of their national identification, nationalism, or political ideology agrees that instability and internecine warfare were a common theme for that time and place, and were not out of place in feudal Europe. 

One of the most important questions for identity East of Warsaw

A central question that affects nationalist movements in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus is: Who is the inheritor of the legacy and heritage of Kievan Rus?  This question is arguably the most important to some.  Another related question is: Where did the crown of Kiev go?  Who inherited it?  The answer to these questions affects not only historical connections considered irrelevant by many, but questions of proper succession.

Kievan Rus is a relatively new term coined by historians.  The Rus did not refer to themselves as “Kievan Rus” during that time period.  It was an idyllic time in some ways, particularly in terms of sovereignty.  Kievan Rus stretched over a vast territory, and was ruled by members of its own culture.  Early Rus nobles were part Scandinavian, but integrated into the local culture.  It was not part of an overlord-vassal relationship like the Grand Duchy of Lithuania would have with western Rus later.  However, political conditions were not idyllic.  Kievan Rus suffered from disunity and instability, as previously mentioned.

Today, this argument over who is the proper successor of ancient Kievan Rus figures into the various battles over identity in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.  Often different parties argue over who is the true heir to the legacy of Rurik, Askold, Dir, Olga, Vladimir the Baptizer, or Vladimir Monomakh.  In the Polish, Litvin nationalist, and Ukrainian nationalist narratives, Moscow was “…simply a backwater, a small town, when Kiev and Polotsk were major trading cities” or some similar concept.  These movements also claim that Moscow was simply an outgrowth or heir to the Mongol Horde. These sentiments dismiss the fact that the ethnos that populated Kiev and Polotsk was the same one that built up Moscow as a city and as a powerful duchy.  The same is true for much older Novgorod, one of the cities that coalesced into Muscovy.  They also dismiss the fact that Moscow arose as a center of Rus that was ruled by Rus while Kiev and Polotsk were ruled by Lithuania. 

The counter argument, from the Russophile side, is that Moscow was the free and independent center of Rus, as it retained more freedom to rule itself and to preserve its culture than the Rus of the GDL or PLC had.  The Mongolian occupation did not change the aristocracy in Muscovy as much as the aristocracy was changed in the GDL and PLC, according to the Russophile narrative.  Rather, Moscow preserved the Rus culture, was ruled by Rus – not Poles – and ran a centuries-long campaign to reunite the Rus and assert a national independence, from approximately 1500 thru 1795.  What Moscow/St. Petersburg managed to accomplish was to unite the previously disunited and warring Rus states into a larger, more stable, more powerful one. 

Russophilia, Litvin nationalism, and Ukrainian nationalism are three strains of thought that deal with questions not only of the past, but of the future.  Russophilia – or Russophilism – is an inclusive movement primarily occupied with reuniting Kievan Rus and engendering a collective consciousness among Muscovites (Great Russians), Belarusians (White Russians), and Ukrainians (Little Russians).  Both Litvin nationalism and Ukrainian nationalism, by contrast, are much more regional, and are separatist in nature.  They insist on separate identity and nation formation, not only from the Great Russians, but also from each other. 

Litvin nationalism operates always at the expense of Muscovite consolidation and nation building.  It is an alternative to Russophilia.  There are essentially two visions of Belarusian sovereignty: one of a separate, landlocked Belarus sitting on the European Plane, geopolitically destined, it would seem, to be controlled from larger powers to the east or west; and another vision of Belarus as a distinct region of a larger, significantly more powerful nation, a great power with an ancient history that stretches from the Baltic to the Pacific.  One vision ties into a bigger unity, and the other is regional. 

The historic competition of national visions for Belarus

Moscow emerged as the powerful center of independent Rus.  After the fall of Constantinople in 1453 to Ottoman Turks, a new vision of the Rus emerged, with the Great Russians thought of as the only major power in the Orthodox world.  Another transformation in the Eastern Roman Empire was accounted as a “fall” in Muscovy at that time as well: the 1439 Union of Florence, in which elements of the Patriarchate of Constantinople went into union with Rome.  Metropolitan Isidore of Moscow, who was one of the Metropolitans who ruled a united Russian Church, also being the Metropolitan of the Orthodox in the GDL, joined the union and was rejected when he returned home, finally living out his days in Italy.  An idea emerged that the Grand Duchy of Moscow was the last hope of the Orthodox world.  The conquest of Islamic nations had overcome so many Christian Byzantine and Balkan lands.  Orthodox populations in Europe such as those in Poland, Lithuania, and Hungary were ruled by Catholic rulers.  Somehow, despite the “Mongol Yoke,” Moscow grew into a powerful state that consolidated power, all while Kiev remained a diminished city controlled by Lithuania, and powerful Novgorod still failed to obtain parity. 

When Tsar Ivan IV was crowned “Tsar and Grand Duke of all Rus” in 1547, a new political era seemed to dawn, with the implication that the old Rus Lands finally had an actual monarch instead of warring princes/dukes.  In truth, the idea of the consolidation of Russia could be traced earlier in history.  The Tsardom of Muscovy developed a culture in which there was a perception of superiority to the GDL, since the GDL was filled with their fellow Rus, but under the control of Roman Catholic Balts and subject to Polish influence.  As time went on, there were concerted efforts to resist westernizations or “Latinizations” within Muscovy.  An example of this movement was the creation of the “Zealots of Piety.”  When Frantsishak Skorina visited Moscow to sell some of his eastern-rite printed books, they were condemned by scholars who considered them to be too full of Latinisms.  Moscow was considered the new heartland of the Rus, yet Rus nobles in the west preferred to maintain allegiance to the Lithuanian Grand Duke, likely due to their preference for those legal structures as pertains to the rights of the nobility.  The “Rise of Moscow” by its very nature articulated a new vision of a large Rus state, united by a powerful monarch, much along the lines of how the Byzantine model related to Greeks throughout the Mediterranean.  This created hostility with Lithuanians who preferred to keep control of their Rus subjects rather than see them integrate into a much vaster, and incomparably more powerful state with their coethnics, thus not only stripping Lithuania of the majority of its population, but creating a potential security threat to Lithuanian independence.  It would seem that the worst nightmare for the Lithuanian government would be a Muscovy reuniting the Rus under a Rus monarch, leaving Lithuanians in a small, weak state between a more powerful Muscovy and Poland, as well as near aggressive Germans. 

There is an argument that the GDL, although it was Lithuanian in more than just name, was implicitly a Belarusian state.  This argument hinges on the historical fact that local aristocracy, which shared blood with the peasants, were empowered participants in the government, whereas later in the Russian Empire, the local aristocracy were disenfranchised by a government coming from the east.  This gives rise to a claim that Belarus was in effect colonized by Muscovy due to a supposed lack of representation in government.  The key reason for the disenfranchisement of the local aristocracy by the Russian Empire was quite simply the fact that they were ethnic Poles ruling over Rus, and the fact that they were prone to revolts.  The old upper class certainly did suffer the loss of rights, or even punishment such as estate confiscation if they were caught being involved with uprisings.  On the other hand, the peasants were considered to be coethnics by the Muscovites, and had new avenues open to them.  Few Belarusian peasants took up arms against the Tsarist government.

The social structure of Belarus and its effects on the ethnic Rus: 1307-1917

Some Litvin nationalists even erroneously refer to the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth as the “Polish Lithuanian Belarusian Commonwealth.”  No such name was ever used historically.  The Rus were vassals to Polish and Lithuanian rulers.  The Grand Duke was a Lithuanian.  The King was a Pole.

After the Partitions of Poland, Polish and Lithuanian hegemony remained intact in the local aristocracy.  The 19^th century populace of Belarus did not naturally rise up against the Russian Empire.  Historians note that one of the defining features of the Belarusians was the apathy of the vast majority toward nationalist causes.  It took Polish and Lithuanian gentry to stir them to action in the few cases in which such action took place.  It is an historical fact that early Belarusian nationalism was the purview of those who were of noble origins from the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth.  This class of people were predominantly – if not entirely – ethnically Polish and Lithuanian.  This class stirred some Belarusians to participation in uprisings.

Until recently, the November Uprising of 1830 and January Uprising of 1863 were widely known as Polish uprisings, with a few voices mentioning Lithuania as well.  Today Litvin nationalists champion the Uprisings as quintessentially Belarusian.  But in fact, the majority of the fighters were Poles and Lithuanians, who at that time were a minority in Belarus.  Upon examining who the ringleaders and fighters of 1863 were, it becomes apparent that it was far more of a Polish affair than anything.  The locations of battles were also much more frequent in the Polish lands than the former Lithuanian lands. 

The 1863 January Uprising resounds loudly in the memory of Litvin nationalists.  Its symbology and the personalities involved became symbols in the development of Litvin nationalism.  Many of the earliest Litvin nationalists were participants.  However, it is noteworthy that they make almost no mention of the peasant uprisings against the PLC that occurred prior to that.  The PLC is sometimes referred to as a “noble’s republic,” and the rights of the nobility as well as the structures of government incentivized Polonization among Rus aristocrats and gentry.  However, the system generally did not provide the level of freedom to the Belarusian peasants that Litvin nationalists often claim.  The true freedoms and liberties of the Commonwealth were directed at the upper classes.  Many of the peasants felt that they were being harshly treated.  Tensions were also created by the enforcement of the Union of Brest by Polish authorities.  The 17^th century saw a major revolt known as the Khmelnitsky Uprising, in which Cossacks in what is now Ukraine sought independence from the PLC.  Later in the 17^th century, uprisings occurred in Grodno, Turov, Pinsk, and Brest.  In the 18^th century, uprisings occurred in Slonim, Mstislavl, Pinsk, Lyubovichi, Mogilev, Bykhov, and Mozyr.  During an uprising in Orsha, approximately forty thousand peasants participated.  One uprising in Krichev lasted four years.  Yet Litvin nationalists only emphasize the uprisings, that were, in fact, majority Polish.

On Russification and Polonization

Ethnic Poles, ethnic Lithuanians, and the Polonized Rus upper classes longed for the days of their commonwealth after the Partitions of Poland.  These three groups tended to coalesce around a Polish identity and vision of their land.  In response to Polish uprisings, the Russian government sought to neutralize the security threat by creating linguistic uniformity in the Empire, and by keeping Polish and Lithuanian nationalisms in check.  These two points were the lynch pins of the group of policies that would become known as Russification. 

At the time of the Partitions of Poland, there was no real Belarusian nationalism.  Belarusian culture was organic and consisted of the common folk ways of the peasantry.  It was seen in the art, language, and religion of the peasantry that would become known as Belarusians.  Upper class people in that territory were culturally, and mostly ethnically, Polish.  From ancient times and into the 19^th century, the people that would become known as Belarusians were distinct from the Poles and Lithuanians. 

If the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was implicitly an actual Belarusian state as Litvin nationalists claim, then it is clear that Polonization wiped out much of the original upper class culture by the mid-16^th century.  Polonization was the gradual re-orientation toward Polish culture as a reference point, and the adoption of elements of Polish culture.  Polonization reoriented perceptions of identity in precisely the same way in which Poles and Litvin nationalists claim that Russification did later in history.  To be clear, both Polonization and Russification were targeted at institutions and their direct effects were mainly felt by the upper classes.  Polonization penetrated the ruling classes of the GDL, who saw it as a means of acquiring strength through union with Poland.  These upper classes also saw Polish culture as superior to their native Rus and Lithuanian cultures. 

Polish hegemony spread to the peasantry through the eventual Union of Brest (which was supported by the Polish state and enacted by members of the upper class educated in local institutions), and the widespread usage of the Polish language.  Even into the early 20th century it was common even for peasants in the former GDL lands to speak Polish in addition to their vernacular.  There is no question that Polish culture dominated the GDL, and it did so in perhaps even deeper ways than Russification did to the former Commonwealth.  The official predecessor language to Belarusian is typically called “Old Ruthenian” today.  This language was both spoken and written in the GDL by the government.  However, eventually it fell out of favor and was replaced with Polish.  For well over a century, little to no writing was done in Old Ruthenian.  The local East Slavic language ceased being a language of intellectuals and government, and became a peasant language. 

Russification was primarily a linguistic operation.  Russification was aimed at officializing the Russian language in the Russian Empire.  This language issue was arguably the only effect of Russification upon Belarusians.  There are some claims that Russification included banning Uniatism and reconstructing art in a new alien style.  These dubious claims are common among Poles and Litvin nationalists and are not supported in objective history.  The liquidation of the Union of Brest in 1840 was voluntary by the church hierarchy, just as the Union of Brest had been in 1596.  Artistic styles from Muscovy spread to the western regions of Rus in a way that is organic within nations; and would be recognized as such if viewed objectively in any other context where Poles, Lithuanians, and Litvin nationalists were not trying to make an argument and create divisions.  The architecture of Belarus, in taking on more Muscovite style, was in fact returning to the continuity of indigenous, pre-Polish architecture, as evidenced by the oldest churches found in Belarus. 

Another claim regarding Russification is that the ethnic identity orientation known as “Westrussianism” (which will be discussed later) developed as a direct result of Russification, and was to some extent a component of it.  This dismisses the historical work carried out by indigenous Belarusian intellectuals in the 19^th century.  One can just as easily make the case that Litvin nationalism was a component of Polonization.  It is noteworthy that the Westrussianists consisted mainly of members of the peasant class; the class that was least impacted by Polonization or Russification.   Whereas the Litvinists consisted almost entirely of upper class ethnic Poles or Catholics of Szlachta background. 

It should be noted that Russification included the implementation of the Cyrillic alphabet among Lithuanians and Poles as well as censorship measures for those groups, so it is understandable how in a Polish or Lithuanian context it could be seen as something artificial and contrived. 

A fact that is often forgotten is that the version of Belarusian language that Litvin nationalists champion was an officialization; a literary language developed in the 19^th century. It replaced multiple dialects in Belarus with a monolithic language.  By the logic of Litvin nationalists, the developers and promoters of Belarusian such as Dunin-Martsinkiewicz, Bahushevich, and Mickiewicz were guilty of replacing local vernaculars with a bigger, more broad language just like Russification did, though Litvin nationalists never seem to admit this point. 

The problem of Smolensk

The history and present of the Smolensk region poses a challenge to the narratives of Litvin nationalists.  Portions of the western Russian Federation were previously held by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, just like the entirety of present day Belarus.  Most notably Smolensk, Bryansk, and Kursk were part of the GDL.  Even Pskov had a Lithuanian prince for a time. 

Smolensk lies between Vilnius and Muscovy, close to the border of present day Belarus.  It was captured by Muscovy in 1514, lost in 1611, and then retaken in 1654.  The people of Smolensk were – and still are to some extent – as “Belarusian” as the people of Minsk or Polotsk or Brest.  They were local Rus that had been controlled by Lithuania, and even their vernacular language was the same as that spoken in Minsk.  After Moscow took Smolensk, the Polish aristocracy moved westward, with many of them settling in Mogilev, which remained inside the PLC.  At the beginning of the twenty first century, traces of the Belarusian language could still be found in the Smolensk region of the Russian Federation. 

Given this history and ethnography, it would seem that Smolensk ought to be considered a part of Belarus.  Despite the genetic and linguistic ties to the lands of present day Belarus, Litvin nationalism never caught on in Smolensk.  This is because Smolensk did not have a strong Polish aristocracy during the 19^th century.  It was controlled by Moscow long before the Partitions of Poland, and never underwent the same process of nationalist development as the lands between Vitebsk and Brest.  Smolensk was never subject to the same Polish forces as those lands.  It was made to be a sort of time capsule.  This reveals the true nature of Litvin nationalism, since the historical process that lead to its emergence is inherently Polish, and the past and present of Smolensk prove this.  Unless a given region had experienced the influence of post-partition Polish aristocrats trying to assert independence from Russia, it followed the path of Russophilism instead of Litvin nationalism. 

Polish-Lithuanian designs for Belarus after the Partitions of Poland

There are three scenarios that seem to have been acceptable to the 19^th century Polish and Lithuanian nobility that lived in present day Belarus, particularly those who participated in uprisings in 1830 and 1863: 1) That the westernmost portions of the Russian empire break off, allowing the reformation of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth.  2) That the same sort of break off results in independent Polish and Lithuanian states, closely reflecting the political boundaries of the Kingdom of Poland the Grand Duchy of Lithuania prior to 1569.  3) A three-way split between Polish, Lithuanian, and “Ruthenian” lands. 

In none of these scenarios were Belarusians allowed to authentically be themselves.  This is because in every one of them, there are Poles and Lithuanians controlling the Belarusian identity.  Even if 1830 or 1863 had been successful from the Polish-Lithuanian perspective, and Belarus ended up being a sovereign state much earlier in its history, the local Polish-Lithuanian gentry would have still controlled the political and ethnic narratives.  It is worthwhile to note, that there is no evidence that the third scenario – involving Belarusian/Ruthenian independence – was planned by the Poles and Lithuanians. 

If the common Belarusians (let us say, during a plebiscite excluding those who were ethnically Polish, Lithuanian, or of a szlachta background) had elected to join the Russian Empire again after a successful uprising, would it have been plausible to expect that the local gentry would have gone along with this wish and watched their holdings pass back into tsarist control?  In another possible scenario: If this theoretical plebiscite resulted in the continued existence of an independent, sovereign Belarus in the 19^th century, given the trend of at least what we can term “warm feelings” or “feelings of kinship” of the local Belarusians toward Muscovites, would the local Poles and Lithuanians have endured political alliance, cultural exchange, and common church administration with St. Petersburg and Moscow? 

In every aforementioned scenario, and in other possible scenarios, Polish and Lithuanian influence would have been exerted on Belarus, particularly in the form of identity formation, or perhaps more correctly: modification.

This section of the essay is theoretical, but perhaps not as theoretical as some may claim, since there is a real historical period in which it actually played out: Interwar Poland. After the Russian Revolution, regions of western Belarus ended up being incorporated into the newly reformed Poland.  There was no separate Belarusian state. Belarusians were an ethnic minority within Pilsudski’s Poland, just as they had been in the past.  Those that remained within Poland ended up being Polonized.  This began in Pilsudski’s Poland and continued afterward.  Those ethnic Belarusians who live in eastern Poland today retain little of their identity.  Such would have been the fate of the rest of Belarus if it had been controlled by 20^th century Poland.

Uprising and radicalism versus Westrussianism

In the 19^th century there was a division of identity in Belarus, the pattern of which is still very visible today.  When the lands of the Rus were reunited in the Russian Empire, there was much angst among the old elites of the PLC, and apparent indifference on the part of the people who would become known as Belarusians.  There were attempts to try and articulate a new identity for the Eastern Slavic residents of modern day Belarus that was separate from the Russian identity of Muscovy – one which glorified the PLC and GDL.  There was also a movement that has by and large been forgotten (it would seem from most media on the subject of Belarus) in which Belarusians saw the Muscovites as co-ethnics and the Poles as foreign occupiers. 

Wincenty Konstanty Kalinowski was a 19^th century nobleman by birth, whose family name hailed from Masovia, Poland.  He was of mixed ethnicity, like many of the nobles, being Polish, Lithuanian, and Belarusian.  But culturally, he was Polish like the rest of his class.  His family had been nobles in the PLC, but by the mid 19^th century they were less wealthy than they had been in the PLC.  He was one of the ring leaders of the 1863 January Uprising.  Kalinowski is considered by some to be the father of the main version of Belarusian nationalism, also known as Litvin nationalism, despite the fact that he did not have this reputation in his own day.  The first document referring to him as a Belarusian nationalist is dated to 1916, more than half a century after his death, during German Occupation, written by Vatslav Lastovsky. 

Kalinowski was actually more of a liberal, democratic, political radical than a nationalist.  However, a narrative – or some would say mythos – was built around him, mostly during the Soviet period.  The famous Belarusian nationalist newspaper Nasha Niva did not mention him during its first production run from 1906-1915.  His name is often Belarusified as “Kastus” which is a Belarusian diminutive of “Konstantin,” his middle name, but it is unlikely that he was called this name during his life.  This demonstrates the morphing of his personage into a specifically Belarusian context by nationalists – and during the Post-Soviet Era, Poles and Lithuanians who seek to distance Belarus from Russia for geopolitical reasons are all too glad to share him with Belarusians.  Kalinowski was primarily concerned with breaking the former GDL out of the Russian Empire, and spoke quite a bit about Poland and Lithuania, though he did have conflicts with some Polish forces. 

In addition to Polish, Kalinowski also spoke Belarusian, which was typical for the nobility.  He published an underground newspaper called Commoner’s Truth (Muzhitskaya Pravda).  In it, he attempted to make contact with the commoners of the Belarusian land in order to stir them to action.  He insisted that Belarus was separate from Russia, and that the commoners should join the old gentry in the fight against the tsar in a liberal, democratic cause.  Kalinowski also wrote for a Polish newspaper called “Banner of Freedom.”  His ideology was affected by the writings of Russian leftists Herzen and Chernyshevsky.

During the January Uprising, the majority of the fighters were Poles.  Belarusian peasants did not show much sympathy for the fight, hence their low participation rates.  This was in spite of the fact that the Polish rebel leaders promised land grants to Belarusian participants.  The Poles, who were a minority, made up the majority of the fighters.  According to court cases after the conflict ended, of those repressed for participation, over 95% of them were Catholics.  The Uprising certainly had a major religious factor to it.  Furthermore, some Belarusian peasants actually took up arms against the Uprising, fighting on the side of the Tsarist government.  The fighting was not as intense in the Northwest Territory as it was in Poland proper. 

One of the defining features of Kalinowski was his liberalism.  This often gets lost amid patriotic Polish and Lithuanian fan-fare (especially around the time of his reburial in 2019), though probably not on purpose.  Most of the focus today is on his patriotism, more than his liberal ideology.  This liberalism was one of the key factors that drove him and guided his efforts.  Much of what he did and what other upper class Poles and Lithuanians did was connected with the idea of liberation, which is understandable in a Polish or Lithuanian context.  Truly though, Kalinowski and his comrades were in fact part of the aristocracy in that region.  They represented the upper class, the old rulers, the well-connected, the established.  This created a complexity to say the least, if not an outright conundrum, considering their belief in liberalism, which would include democratic and egalitarian principals, as well as the principal of self-determination.  The key problem with their intellectual work is reconciling the fact that they, as upper class rulers who ruled another ethnicity for so long (what we now call Belarusians) began to admonish this lower class ethnicity as to who they really were. 

Another similar szlachta nobleman was Frantsishak Bahushiewicz.  Modern Belarusian philosopher Valiantsin Akudovich was quoted as saying: “God created the Universe, Bahushiewicz invented Belarus.”   Like Kalinowski, he spoke and wrote Belarusian and also fought in the November Uprising.  He wrote poetry that promoted separatism from Russia.  He wrote a book of poetry “Smyk Belaruski” or “Belarusian Violin Bow.”  This poem accentuated the usage of the violin in popular Belarusian music – an instrument that came into widespread usage by virtue of the western-oriented PLC.  Violins were also in use in Muscovy, though typically in orchestral settings.  Another szlachta writer who did similar work was Adam Mickiewicz, an ethnic Lithuanian.

One could say that the idea that Kalinowski, or Bahushevich were liberating Belarus is inaccurate.  More so for Tadeusz Kosciusko, who was a nobleman who took up arms in an attempt to reverse the Partitions of Poland and re-assert Polish control over the Belarusians.  It is clear that the old szlachta was trying to recreate its Commonwealth.  The notion that Belarus was better ruled by Lithuanians and Poles, which is a common narrative, flies in the face of the notion of nation, and of the principal that colonialism is inherently immoral. 

Today, a chapter of Belarus’s cultural and intellectual history is largely forgotten.  Litvin nationalists from the 19^th and early 20^th centuries are well known.  But their contemporary opponents have been eliminated from the collective memory of Belarusian media.  There was arguably more intellectual activity from Belarusians opposed to Litvin nationalism, and more Belarusian intellectuals who embraced Russian nationalism.  This seemed to hold true for most of the peasant population as well.  This trend or movement is referred to as “Westrussianism.” 

Mikhail Koyalovich, from Grodno, was probably the best known intellectual who articulated the idea that Belarusians were a type of Russian, and not a separate nation.  In his view, Belarus was a region of Russia that had been dominated by Poles and experienced some changes, primarily among the upper classes.  He regarded the Russian partitioning of Poland as a glorious reunion of Rus.  Scholars such as Platon Zhukovich, from Pruzhany, and Lukian Solonevich, from Grodno, articulated similar views.

Solonevich responded to the Litvin nationalist newspaper Nasha Niva by saying: “Poor, blind Nasha Nivtsi, do you not see now that in your blind desire to tear Belarusians apart from the Russian people, from Russian culture, and from the Orthodox Faith, you are being nothing more than a blind tool in the hands of Polish politicians, for whom Belarusian culture can only be manure for fertilizing Polish soil?”

Nikolai Lossky, a philosopher with Belarusian roots was quoted as saying: “The whole history of Belarusians is the history of the struggle of Belarusians for their Russianness.”

On the few occasions when the topic of Westrussianism is discussed, General Mikhail Muravyov is shown as its leader, whether it is in a titular or formal context.  This is done because Muravyov was a Muscovite with no known roots in Belarus.  As a tsarist government enforcer, chiefly charged with subduing rebellions in the Northwestern Krai, he is easily portrayed as an historical villain.  By tying Westrussianism to him, any sympathies or consideration for it are delegitimized if one can present him as a foreign villain.  In fact, there were many Belarusians who supported Muravyov.  By making him the de facto face of Westrussianism, Litvin nationalists have been able to prevent a serious understanding of Westrussianism (whether academic or popular).  Westrussianism was the popular position of the lower class people who represented the most authentic expressions of Belarusian culture, whereas Litvinism was the popular position of the Polonized upper classes. 

In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, a tiny Belarusian state was formed: the Belarusian Democratic Republic.  The short-lived state was the product of nationalist political liberals who opposed the Russian Imperial system.  They were aligned with left wing revolutionary forces, but were not Bolsheviks.  It is difficult to ascertain what came first: their liberal political ideals or their nationalism.  Vaclav Lastouski, the editor of Nasha Niva served as prime minister.  A new flag was created by this milieu, one which resembled the flag of Poland, or could be seen as an inversion of the flag of the PLC (sans crest).  A new state symbol – the “Pahonia” – was adopted.  Pahonia is translated “Chase” and features a warrior on a horse wielding a drawn sword and carrying a shield.  The Pahonia symbol adopted by the BDR was very similar to the GDL Pahonia symbol, except for the fact that the cross of St. Evfrosinya replaced the form of the equal-armed cross on the GDL Pahonia.  The Pahonia had also appeared on the crests of the Russian Imperial Governates of Vilno, Vitebesk, and Mogilev, regions of present day Belarus.  The nationalists identified the heritage of Belarus with the GDL.  They considered the GDL to be an ethnogenesis as well.  The founding national narrative of the state was that the GDL was an implicitly Belarusian state that enjoyed fraternal and constructive relations with Poland, and was then annexed and occupied by the Russian Empire, which they viewed as a foreign people – more foreign than Poles or Lithuanians.  This founding narrative and its symbols were resurrected over 70 years later in the service of modern, post-Soviet nationalists, who picked up where the BDR had left off.  The symbols also served as a form of sovereignty recognition, since they were some of the only available local symbols.  If Belarus was to be independent, the political reformers of the early 1990s sought to use an adjacent available symbology, the meaning of which they likely did not fully understand at the time.   

Westrussianism was opposed by Soviet authorities due to their Indigenization policies.  The Soviets promoted the development of Belarusian nationalism, much along the Litvin lines, though post-Soviet Litvin nationalists tend to detest the Soviet period.  Westrussianism was viewed as a remnant of the old traditional structures that the Soviets were trying to replace.  Aleksandr Tsvikyevich, the prime minister of the BSSR from 1923-1925, considered Westrussianists to be internal enemies of the people because of the opposition of their works to the dominant Soviet historiography, which contained Litvin talking points.  The Soviets understood that Belarusians were effectively an underclass – which was true , and this is why the delineation of a Belarusian people group was valued by them.  Belarusian identity was seen as something that could tie into themes of class struggle.  This concept of Belarusian class struggle was seen in the context of the Russian Empire, more than the PLC or GDL according to the Soviets.  It is noteworthy that the Soviet authorities considered Wincenty Kalinowski to be a folk hero because of his liberal egalitarianism. 

The narrative that is usually advanced by Poles, Lithuanians, and Litvin nationalists is that Belarus was simply governed better by the PLC and that it had more freedom than it did as part of the Russian Empire.  It is important to note that this assertion gets into other political and philosophical discussions of monarchy versus polyarchy, of the establishment of certain legal principals, and into value judgements of various government policies.  It also gets into the realm of governmental priorities, namely: what sort of laws and institutions should Belarus have?  The discussion moves away from heritage, culture, traditional morality, and religion, and presupposes the superiority of liberal models of government.  This prioritization of liberalism is probably the primary driver behind cultivating a Belarusian nationalism separate from that of Russia (Muscovy) in this Post-Soviet Period. 

The narrative war

Today, there are two predominant views about Belarus within the space of Belarus, Poland, Lithuania, and Russia: 1) That Belarus and Russia are part of a larger civilization, and perhaps, are actually the same nation, with Belarus simply being a distinct region, and Russia as it exists today being a partial or incomplete political and geographic formation.  2) That Belarus and Russia are two distinct nations, and that Belarus shares more kinship with Poland and Lithuania.

In one view, one sees Muscovy as the actual, literal brother of Belarus.  Lithuania and Poland were the foreigners.  Any notion of alleged Muscovite colonialism in Belarus pales in comparison to the act of control by Lithuania and Poland.  If Great Russian control of Belarus in the Russian Empire was somehow an “occupation,” how much more was the control of Lithuania and Poland an occupation?  They were not related to the Belarusians nearly as much as the Muscovites were.  The Lithuanians were Balts, and the Poles were Western Slavs, who had nothing to do with Rus.  There is a notion that is pivotal in determining if the tsardom was just and good (but the discussion of this notion is certainly not as important to modern politics as it used to be): If one is truly a son or daughter of Kievan Rus, does it not follow that one should seek out the heir to Kievan Rus; and is that heir not Muscovy and subsequently St. Petersburg?  Besides strict formalities and arguments of succession, the Muscovite argument is predicated upon culture.  It argues based upon the existence of a separate Orthodox, Eurasian, Greek-East sort of civilization.  This is juxtaposed with the Latin-West, which came to dominate the Western Slavs, and eventually, the Lithuanians.  While certainly true of Medieval Muscovy, there is an argument that the Rus within the GDL and PLC also experienced this East-West separateness, due to their own culture and heritage, which was allowed to remain separate and intact to some extent within those larger western-oriented states. 

In another view, one sees Lithuania and Poland as positive historical actors in Belarus who included it in their polity for centuries.  This certainly left a mark on the Belarusians.  During the entire time that Belarus was ruled by the GDL and PLC, the peasant class of people were recognized as Rus.  They remained relatively intact as a people within those larger states.  Polonization was mostly targeted at the wealthy, and one can understand the motivation in a noble allowing themselves to be Polonized.  It was simply a matter of time that the nobility would lose their Rus-ness (or Russianess, if you like) due to the realities of political power.  Today, politicians and businesspeople all over the world wear the standard three-piece suit of Europe, departing from their traditional garments.  This is because of the world’s economic and political power structures being Eurocentric – at least up until the end of the 2010s.  People engaged in long distance enterprise adjust themselves according to powerful cultures that are not their own.  It is an historical fact that the Rus aristocracy within the GDL and PLC had their culture modified and became more western.  But in the case of the commoners, the people who would become known as Belarusians, there are arguments that the GDL and PLC were better at governing than the Muscovites.  Usually these sentiments hinge on discussion of Magdeburg Law, Golden Freedoms, and other institutions. 

Tsarina Catherine II (The Great) issued a commemorative metal after the Partitions of Poland, in which almost all of the territories of former Kievan Rus were joined to the Russian Empire.  On this metal was a quote that is widely mocked in Poland and Lithuania, and one that enrages Litvin nationalists: “What had been torn away, I returned.”  The quote refers to the historical reality that much of the old Rus territory had been annexed and ruled by ethnic Lithuanians and Poles.  Catherine, in overseeing the Partitions of Poland, had managed to bring almost all of these territories back together into one country.

But narratives such as those of Catherine the Great are said to be “Russian propaganda” or “distortions.”  One can just as easily point to the writings and speeches of Bahushiewicz, and other Belarusian “Litvin” nationalists and claim that their views are “propaganda” or “distortions.”  Who is telling the truth?  The answer to that question, while illusive, is not trivial, nor is it necessarily impossible to find. 

There is a deeper meaning within the celebration of the GDL by Litvin nationalists: The GDL was the party most at fault for the division of Kievan Rus.  It carved up Kievan Rus and created separate regions which form modern day Belarus and Ukraine.  Were it not for the annexation of these lands by the GDL, Belarus and Ukraine would not have developed alternative nationalisms to Russian nationalism – or more correctly “Russophilism.”  “Russia,” as we know it today, would be much larger, stronger, and more populous.  But today, there is a fundamental disunity of Rus because of the very institution that Litvin nationalists champion: the GDL. 

A claim of Litvin nationalists is that the GDL was actually more of a Belarusian grand duchy than a Lithuanian grand duchy.  It is true that actual ethnic Lithuanians had a much smaller population than the Rus ancestors of modern Belarusians.  But this does not change the fact that the grand duke was a Lithuanian.  Furthermore, it is fascinating that Litvin nationalists promote the idea of the GDL as a proto-Belarusian state while also tending to ally with Ukrainian nationalists against Russophilia.  The GDL also included most of what is today Ukraine, excluding the Wild Fields, which were not populated by the Rus.  A small portion of Ukraine was controlled directly by the crown of Poland.  If one claims that the GDL was Belarusian, then by logical necessity they must also claim that Ukraine is actually Belarusian.  Virtually no Litvin nationalist believes this, and so a conundrum is formed. 

The crux of the Litvin nationalist argument is a disagreement over who has right to rule Rus.  The answer to these two questions determine most of the politics and identity formation in Belarus: “Did Muscovy serve as a sort of center for all of Rus?” and “Did the PLC represent a more authentic continuation of Kievan Rus than Muscovy?”  Before the Soviet times, most Belarusians would have said yes to the first and no to the second.  One historical reality is certain: Muscovy emerged as the only self-ruled part of Rus.  The rest of Rus was in vassalage to Poles and Lithuanians.  The point of cleavage tends to be the issue of whether the PLC government or Tsarist government were superior. 

There is a narrative popular among Poles – which ended up being a foundational narrative for Litvin as well as Ukrainian nationalists – that Muscovy was simply an outgrowth of the Mongol Horde.  This narrative posits that the institution and nature of the Muscovite tsar came about as a type of Khan, and that Muscovite culture and governance was more Mongolian or Tartarian than European.  While no one can deny the presence of Asian influences, this narrative obfuscates a major historical dynamic.  The prototype of the tsar of Muscovy was not a Khan, but the Byzantine Basileus (Emperor).  As time went on, the western-oriented Poland ended up accepting Enlightenment Era liberal ideas of government which differed greatly from the values and institutions of Muscovite government.  This comparison between the liberal West and Moscow was the basis for the Mongolian narrative.  Regardless of when exactly the narrative emerged, as time went on and Polish people became increasingly liberal, it was only exacerbated and magnified.

Another view of the Litvin nationalists is that Belarus is a “multi-confessional” nation.  This sentiment is engineered to negate the fact that it was the Orthodox Church that was one of the main distinguishing features of Belarusians besides their language.  This fact creates two issues for the Litvin nationalist narrative: first it is a point of division between Belarusians and their Catholic rulers who are lionized and glorified in that narrative, and second it is a feature that ties Belarusians more to the Muscovites than the two aforementioned groups.  The two features that most distinguished the Belarusians from Poles and Lithuanians within the Grand Duchy were their language and religion.  Litvin nationalists capitalize on the first point – language – using it as one of their distinguishing features to separate themselves from Muscovy, but neglect to mention that the Belarusian language is actually more closely related to Russian than Polish.  Over time, Polish became influential in forming the modern Belarusian language, but the roots of the language are identical to that of Moscow.  Church Slavonic is also frowned upon by the Litvin nationalists because it is a major tie with Muscovy and the whole Slavic Orthodox world – a tie that they must break in order to not so much legitimize their claims, as to engineer a new Belarus.  To their chagrin, they are forced to admit, as a fact of history, that their ancestors prayed in Slavonic.  The few schismatic Belarusian “Orthodox” church communities that exist around the world, as well as the modern Belarusian Greek Catholic Church, have replaced Slavonic with the vernacular as a means of accomplishing the transformation that is necessary to uphold their narrative.  Where distinctions with Russia do not exist, they are created.

If the language and religion were the key defining features of Belarusians, then surely they point to an authentic sense of identity.  If the Belarusian language separates Belarus from Muscovy – per the narrative of the Litvin nationalists – then how much more does it separate Belarus from Poland or Lithuania?  And certainly Orthodoxy ties Belarus to Muscovy and separates it from Poland and Lithuania, which is a point that nobody argues with.  So in both areas, linguistically and religiously, the argument for closer association with Russia than with Poland or Lithuania wins out.  This is the key reason why Litvin nationalists must reinvent Belarusian identity.  Their movement has little to do with actual Belarusian identity and history.  This is why Litvin nationalists target Belarusian language as a means of differentiating themselves from Russia, and why a minority of them attempt to re-invent the Russian Orthodoxy of Belarus in a new form.  They seek to invent a new and different identity.

In various narratives, we hear the name “Ruthenia” used to describe Belarus and Ukraine.  Most of the time, this term is used in juxtaposition to the term “Russia,” however this was not the case historically.  The term “Ruthenia” has been subjected to increasing restriction over time, to the extent that it has lost its original meaning relatively recently.  Today, Ruthenia is used almost exclusively to refer to western Rus: Belarus, Ukraine, and Carpathia.  But originally, Ruthenia meant a broad area, literally being the Latin version of the Slavic name “Rus.”  This Latin exonym was applied not only to the Rus of the GDL as modern nationalists say, but was also applied to Muscovy – including the more eastward territories of Muscovy, such as the Caspian Sea shore and Arctic Ocean.  There is one sub-narrative that Ruthenia consists only of these western lands of present day Belarus and Ukraine, and that Muscovy was not referred to as “Rus” or even “Rossiya” until later in history, but rather “Moscovia”; therefore this means that the contemporary definition of “Ruthenia” holds.  The problem of this narrative is that in the days of city states and principalities, it was common to refer to a place by it’s capital’s name instead of an ethnic or national name.  This was as true for Moscow as it was for Polotsk, Novgorod, Chernigov, or Kiev.  The fact that some found it necessary to redefine the term “Ruthenia” should cause any honest historian or ethnographer to become suspicious.  It is likely that the restriction of the term had much to do with the fact that this Latin exonym was probably employed most frequently by the Catholic Church to refer to the particular Rus lands with which they were most involved, namely the Rus lands of the PLC. 

The name Belarus itself is a restrictive name, as it labels a specific region of Rus, whose primary distinction from the other parts of Rus for the last 500 years has been local vernacular language.  The entire area of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus was called “Rus” until relatively recently in history.  The name of Belarus as well as that of Ukraine were coined specifically to differentiate these regions from Muscovy.  Muscovy took up the mantle of Rus, and so if a person were to have separatist desires in Belarus or Ukraine, it is rather useful to rename the space to create further division and differentiation.  Even Rus people who were separatists who were against the incorporation of their lands into the Russian Empire went by the name of “Rus” because that was and is their proper label.  Later on, it was found to be advantageous to go by some other name like “Belarusian” or “Ukrainian” as a means of creating a new identity since the subject of said “Rus” has been so clearly dominated by the Muscovites for so long.  If one wishes to reject Muscovy or the “Great Russians” as their fellow nationals, they must in a sense leave Rus itself. 

As mentioned previously, the prioritization of liberalism is likely the primary driver behind cultivating a Belarusian nationalism separate from that of Russia (Muscovy).  Today, it is unlikely that liberal westernized Belarusians who subscribe to Litvin nationalism do so because they are trying to recover a “true identity.”  Such people could not care less about heritage and tradition.  That same concept of “true identity” was also present in the policies and narratives of the Russian Empire whose memory they scorn.  It seems that the true motivation behind Litvin nationalism today is the advancement of political changes.  Litvin nationalism is simply a vehicle for this change.  The liberal Belarusian who wishes to resist a Russian Federation perceived of as reactionary and anti-Western, has at their disposal a number of narratives and symbols from Belarus’s past.  Of course, these narratives and symbols come from a Polish/Lithuanian ruling class, and not from the Rus. 

Belarus at Ellis Island

What follows is a relevant historical dynamic found in the field of American ethnography -and Slavic studies.  American ethnographic and historical records have preserved a snapshot of Belarusians in the early 20^th century.  There was a gigantic wave of Eastern European immigrants that came to the US from the late nineteenth century, up until World War I.  They primarily came to satisfy the labor demands of growing American industries.  There was a promise of wealth on a level that was almost impossible to obtain in their home countries at the time.  Those immigrants hold a key to understanding what Belarus was like at that time.  This was because of the superior historical record keeping in America at that time, for these pre-Soviet people.

To the chagrin of modern Belarusian nationalists, the majority of immigrants from what is now the territory of Belarus, who were not ethnic Poles or Lithuanians identified as “Russian” during and after their arrival in America.

If the narrative was true that the Belarusians were persecuted by the Russian government; if they were groveling under oppression; if they were disgruntled and bemoaning Russification; if they were siding with the narratives that Poles and Lithuanians were pushing on them before and during that period, then it would logically follow that once they were on American soil and able to pursue their own destiny and celebrate their true, self-determined identity, that they would have undoubtably set up Belarusian nationalist societies and institutions, shedding any love for “Russia” or the Russian national idea.  The vast majority did the complete opposite.  They called themselves by the name “Russian,” formed Russian societies, and used their few impoverished immigrant pennies to build Russian Orthodox Churches that were connected with the Church of Moscow, and as a consequence, its narratives about Russian historiography and identity, namely the idea of the “Triune Slavic Nation” or “Svyataya Rus” (Holy Rus).   

Researchers in Russian-American history and ethnography will note that the vast majority of Russian immigrants to the U.S. during the period of Ellis Island came from the westernmost regions of the Russian Empire (Belarus, western Ukraine, eastern Poland) as well as a number of Russophillic Carpatho Rusyns from the Carpathian and Galician regions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 

These facts tend to anger proponents of different nationalist movements from these places.  In issuing a response or rebuttal to the aforementioned history, Litvin nationalists, as  well as others, are forced to admit the fact that their nationalism was in infant form at that time.  They are forced to admit that their vision of Belarus was and is a movement aimed at spreading their national idea, their brand of patriotism, their particular view on ethnic identity.  A narrow minority view of Belarus which was conceived and spread by ethnic Lithuanian and Polish aristocrats is presented as the true one, and somehow these many immigrants must have been delusional when calling themselves “Russian” up to the moment of their death, free to call themselves whatever they wished, by virtue of being in America. 

The Russian Orthodox Church as a uniting institution

Over time, as old Kievan Rus became divided, the Russian Orthodox Church served as a bridge between political entities.  Historians have rightly identified it as the central institution of Russian identity, even beyond that of the tsardom.  From 988 to 1589, the Orthodox Church in Muscovy as well as the GDL shared administration within the Patriarchate of Constantinople.  There was exchange over the border, and the Patriarchate preferred to keep the Church of Rus united, and uniform despite its being in separate – and often mutually antagonistic – states.  For approximately half of that time, one single Metropolitanate united Muscovy with Belarus.  For those familiar with the hierarchy of Orthodoxy, this statistic is not trivial when understanding local ministry, pastoral life, and Church ethos.  It is important to note that the GDL government often insisted that Constantinople create a local Metropolitanate separate from Moscow, and this was done at their behest.  In 1686 after less than a century of combating Uniatism, Constantinople extended the control of the new Patriarch of Moscow (formed in 1589) to Belarus and Ukraine.

Litvin nationalists are indeed correct in their assessment that there is a direct correlation between Russian Orthodoxy and favorable views toward Russia within Belarus.  But this is because the forces of heterodoxy are the main forces in opposition to a relationship with the Muscovites.  It is an historical fact that it was Roman Catholics that were the main proponents of a separate Belarusian identity.  It logically follows for the church of Moscow to promote unity with their brethren living under a Catholic ruling class.  There is a claim that because the church is controlled in Moscow, that it must be some sort of political propaganda arm.  But regardless of whether that is true or not, all of the motivation was there on the part of Catholics to create division with Moscow, effectively making the Uniates and Latin Rite Catholics as much, if not more, of a political arm than the Russian Orthodox Church.  To the claim that the ROC was a form of Muscovite soft power, an equal claim can be made against the Roman Catholic Church as being a form of Western soft power, controlled from Rome and with strong backing by ethnic Poles.

Religion is arguably the deepest aspect of identity.  Orthodox Christianity is a principal of unity for Rus, and therefore it only follows that if one is a pious Orthodox Christian in Rus, one would subscribe to the concept of Holy Rus (Svyataya Rus).  If the true, original identity of the Belarusians is an Orthodox one, then it would follow that if Orthodoxy is taken away, the Belarusians will have lost themselves and become something new and different.  Their nobility certainly did, as they were Polonized. 

According to one Litvin nationalist narrative, the Unia in Belarus was more close to the people because toward its end, vernacular Belarusian replaced Slavonic to some extent.  However, the Unia in Belarus had actually lost a lot of the old pre-1596 traditions that made Belarusian worship distinct from that of the Poles and Lithuanians.  The Iconostasis, perhaps the most distinct interior feature in Orthodox churches, had been removed in many of them.  Organs were added, and there was a slow progression from the Eastern Rite to the Latin Rite.  On a deeper theological level there was a Latin shift that occurred as well.  For example, in the Orthodox Church Gregory Palamas is venerated as a saint, whereas he was condemned by the Roman Catholic Church as a heretic.  At the time of the Union of Brest it was acceptable for the Uniates to read Palamas and embrace his “Essence versus Energies” distinction that was at odds with Roman theology.  At the Council of Zamosc in 1720 the Uniates agreed to abandon and condemn Palamas.  

If a Belarusian grants priority to Orthodoxy, then there is one unavoidable fact: Moscow was a bulwark for Orthodoxy and was solely responsible for restoring Orthodoxy in Belarus.  The presence of the Patriarchate (technically a Metropolitanate from 1721-1917) allowed the Uniate bishop Iosif Semashko to convert to Orthodoxy and bring his flock with him.  Moscow was able to provide institutional support to all Belarusians who were converting back to the church of their ancestors.  Had Poles and Lithuanians been in power, Semashko’s efforts would have met resistance.  Even while entertaining the separatist view of some Belarusians, there is still an undeniable fact: even if Belarus ought to be a sovereign state, completely independent of Russia; if it ought to continue development of a separate nationalism; even if the Belarusian Orthodox Church ought to be granted autocephaly and separate from Moscow, a debt of gratitude is still justly owed to the Patriarchate of Moscow for restoring Orthodoxy.  Without the Russian Empire, Belarus’s Orthodox Christians would be a small minority, and it is likely that Uniatism or even Latin Rite Catholicism would still be the predominant religion of Belarus. 

Repressions

One of the most powerful forces in politics – particularly Western liberal politics – is not a political theory or theory of social science.  It is a narrative of suffering.  Nothing fires up Westerners like a tale of oppression.  Westerners pride themselves on the narrative that they are trying to liberate others around the world through various means.  This is not necessarily a bad passion to have.  There truly are disempowered people in need throughout the world.  But often narratives of oppression create distortions because they play more to man’s emotional faculties than his rational ones.  For example, look at how many Americans became sympathetic to the cause of Scottish independence as a result of watching the movie Braveheart.  These Americans cannot tell you much about the history of England or Scotland.  They typically cannot list differences between England and Scotland, save for a majestic accent and kilts.  Very few indeed would be able to explain why Scotland is presently part of the UK.  But they still feel passionate about Scottish independence because of the way that the movie made them feel.

Repressions certainly occurred during the Soviet Period in Belarus.  Kurapaty happened.  Litvin nationalists try to milk every milliliter of sympathy from such events, imagining them as uniquely theirs.  Though, they frame it as a Russian versus Belarusian repression.  There were untold, immeasurable sufferings in the Soviet Union as a result of political and religious repressions.  What happened in Belarus happened in other regions as well.  The tale of Kurapaty is one of countless tales of people who were inconvenient to the Soviet government, and were subsequently murdered. 

There is a good reason why the Soviets created the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic instead of simply attaching it to the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic under the name “Northwestern Krai” or a similar name.  The Soviets were trying to co-opt Belarusian nationalism, and those nationalists that did not fit the mold were to be destroyed, just like everyone who failed to fit the mold.  Furthermore, during Soviet purges there was much collateral damage, which is to say, party members – people who actually did “fit the mold” – were also annihilated to make way for new party members who owed their position to the Soviet hierarchy and would repay with loyalty.

What is heard and observed from Litvin nationalists

If one pays attention to social media accounts that articulate the narratives of Litvin nationalists, one cannot help but notice the large number of Poles and Lithuanians who take keen interest and comment.  Just as in the 19^th century, there is much Polish and Lithuanian activity surrounding Litvin nationalism. 

Most media sources that promote a separate identity from Russia for Belarus are based in Poland and Lithuania.  NATO government media also promotes these narratives.  Virtually all online and television networks that articulate the Litvin narrative are based abroad.  There is no need to elaborate or name media outlets here and list their affiliations, location, or origin.  All one must do is look at their “About” section on their website.

English is a preferred language of Litvin nationalists, because of how much they communicate with Poles, Lithuanians, and Americans.  The lingua franca of our day is used extensively by those who seek a “European Future” for Belarus.  It also demonstrates a connection with the think tanks and the elites of the American governmental system.

Although one of the defining features of Belarusians in juxtaposition to their ethnic Polish and Lithuanian neighbors was their religion, this is purposefully dismissed by the Litvin nationalists.  They insist that Belarus is a “multi-confessional nation.”  They do this to obscure and destroy authentic Belarusian identity. 

One prediction for the future of Belarus is that its name may change before the close of the 21^st century.  It is likely that Litvin nationalists will reject the very name “Belarus” because it contains the term “Rus.”  Some have even proposed the name “Great Litva” as an alternative name, though this name has not caught on.  As of the early 2020s, Litvin nationalists have launched a broad campaign to rename Belarus in foreign languages.  In some languages, Belarus is literally written “White Russia,” and has been identified as such for a considerable time.  Litvin nationalists must change this name to deliberately sever any ties to wider Rus civilization.

Litvin nationalists complain about the architectural style used in the construction of new Orthodox churches in Belarus.  This is because they would prefer to see them built in a more Polish style, similar to churches built or remodeled in the Unia.  As previously related, the current style of Orthodox church architecture in Belarus is basically a return to pre-GDL style.  Although the Litvin nationalists object in cases where there are historical churches built by the Unia or Latin Rite Catholics, or remodeled by Polish builders – stylistically identical or similar to Polish Latin Rite Catholic churches – which have had onion domes and other Russian elements placed on them post hoc, they seem to have no problem with the fact that many old Orthodox churches were heavily modified and rebuilt in a Polish style. 

Litvin nationalists celebrate Polish heroes such as Kosciusko and Kalinowski or the victory of the GDL at the Battle of Orsha over the Grand Duchy of Muscovy. Anything to separate themselves from the eastern parts of Rus.  Generally speaking, the only hero of Rus that is celebrated by Litvin nationalists is Evfrosynia of Polosk.  This is likely only because the two-bar form of the cross that she famously commissioned to be built out of gold and precious stones for liturgical use found its way into Litvin nationalist symbology.  Even Prince Vladimir and Prince Rurik are barely mentioned. 

Demonstrative examples of Litvin nationalist narratives can be found within online reviews, comments sections, and place listings for Belarus.  Anything associated with the Orthodox Church, Russia, or simply the topic of the broad category “Rus” is “one-starred” or down-thumbed by Litvin nationalist activists.  Here is one example: Among other landmarks and tourist attractions in Vitebsk, the reviews for a monument to Alexandr Nevsky and his wife Paraskevia (who was from Vitebsk) are overwhelmingly positive.  As with most listings, a handful of negative reviews can be found, ranging from criticism of the quality of the sculpture, to its funding.  One negative review stands out, as it attacks the appropriateness of the statue in Belarus.  The man writing the review complains that Nevsky was alien to Belarus, had done nothing for Belarus, and had never visited Vitebsk.  If one examines the other reviews written by this particular gentleman, among American fast-food restaurants, there are a number of favorable reviews for sites in Poland and for Catholic churches.  This anecdote is very telling, and reflects a broader trend.  Other Litvin nationalists have also challenged the appropriateness of the monument.  Alexandr Nevsky was the Rus prince who, among other accomplishments, defeated the Teutonic Knights during their attempt to conquer Pskov, Novgorod, and probably the rest of Rus.  He is one of the most well-known heroes of Rus in general.  Beyond Russia, he is well known in the Orthodox world as an historic defender of the Orthodox East against what is regarded as a Latin crusade of his time period.  He is a saint in the Orthodox Church, remembered as a wise diplomat, a man of humility, and is seen as a hero and symbol for the defense of Rus and Orthodoxy in general.  Most Litvin nationalists omit the fact that Nevsky lived before Lithuania annexed what is now Belarus, technically a time period when Belarus was inside of the same country as Nevsky.  They also omit the fact that the Teutonic Knights were also enemies of Lithuania, and may have conquered it if Nevsky had not defeated them.  The rejection of a coethnic hero of the Belarusians shows the disregard for the actual identity and heritage in Rus, and instead, measures Belarusianness exclusively in terms of Lithuanian and Polish orientation.  According to Litvin nationalists, one can only be as Belarusian as much as one allows themselves to be influenced by Lithuania or Poland; a wholesale rejection of Rus is a prerequisite to their sense of identity. 

Litvin nationalists claim that Belarus has a long and proud history as an independent nation.  They claim that it was separate from Rus, that it has always had a sort of independence, but is for some reason an outgrowth of Lithuania.  Today, amid a turbulent political climate and numerous demonstrations against the government and even smaller ones against Russia itself, one can observe the Litvin nationalists making statements to the effect of: “Belarus is currently being born amid the protests!” or “The Belarusian nation is being formed right now, as the Pahonia symbol and white-red-white flag are waved!”  There is no agreement on when Belarus was created, as the same people who speak often of Orsha, the GDL, Polotsk’s supposed Medieval nationalism, and Kosciusko’s Uprising also make statements that now, in the Post-Soviet Era, Belarus is actually, really, being created as a new nation.   One might say that it is as if the nation of Belarus is continuously being born to these people.

As previously mentioned, Smolensk and some eastern GDL territories were annexed by Muscovy long before the Partitions of Poland.  Yet there was no Belarusian nationalist movement there, which further proves that Litvin nationalism is a newer movement, arising from the activities of 19^th century, post-Partition, Polish gentry. 

If Litvin nationalists think that Belarus was born in the past and then occupied by Russia, then they must by logical necessity consider the GDL and PLC to be foreign occupiers as well.  Additionally, they must state precisely when this independent nation was born.  If Belarus was born within the GDL, then the Litvin nationalists must by logical necessity accuse Lithuania of the same crime they accuse Moscow of: manipulating the people and creating a fake, altered cultural sphere.  If Belarus is only being born now, then they must admit that it is a modern creation, inconsistent with traditional norms of Belarus (an entity that they consider to be ancient); a project who’s foundation was laid by Polish and Lithuanian aristocrats, and then built up by nationalist forces desiring to create a smaller version of Post-Soviet Russia, but with a more liberal, western orientation – which of course, is historically not the identity of Belarusians, as explained earlier. 

The eastern narrative: the past, the present, and the future

2022 has shown the need for stability and reconciliation in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.  One thing that all parties likely agree on is that a long term solution is needed regional tensions.  This is of dire importance.  Fundamental fault lines have emerged and have been laid bare for the world to see.  The Rus have essentially gone back to being a divided, antagonistic set of principalities, much like they were prior to Muscovite consolidation.  While the borders themselves have shifted, yet again, and regions have globed together into larger political formations, the divisions of feudal times have remerged.  Outside influence also plays a role, yet again.  History has repeated, and it could be argued that some times in the past, particularly the 19^th century, were better than the present, and more promising than the future looks. 

The purpose of this essay is not to encourage feelings of antagonism toward Belarus’s neighbors Poland and Lithuania.  Such a relationship would be to Belarus’s detriment.  Belarusians should not engage in the sort of critical, oppression-based thinking found in the modern west, where obsessions with anti-colonialism and “restorative justice” create tensions both within society and between groups abroad.  Rather, it would be to Belarus’s benefit to have a more balanced view of history than that offered by the Litvin nationalists.  For all of the aforementioned reasons, Belarus ought to look at its history and realize that it is and was part of the historical category of “Rus”, even for the entire time when it was controlled by Poles and Lithuanians, and that it ought to not discard its ties to the Russian Federation and Ukraine.  Belarusian identity is under considerable pressure by outside forces, that seek to rehabilitate their image as occupiers of Belarus by morphing it into an image of sophisticated, Latin westerners bringing Latin western civilization to the Rus.  For some reason today, when the topic of occupation comes up in mainstream media as well as “alternative media” with regard to Belarus, Muscovites (who are historical siblings to Belarusians) are viewed as foreign occupiers and exploiters, yet the Baltic Lithuanians and Western Slav Poles, each with their deep ties to the Latin west, are seen as noble patricians who shepherded the Rus within their realm toward a more civilized life.  In the one case, the polity which carried on Kievan civilization, which had deeper cultural ties to the actual Belarusian people is viewed as the foreigner and oppressor, whereas the true foreigners who took over and ruled Belarus, leaving their marks, are seen as noble and brotherly.

We do not live in the past, and to do so defeats the purpose of learning about the past.  The past certainly does affect us today, making the study of history, ethnography – and therefore this essay – very relevant.  But on a fundamental level there is a need to plan for the future: to act on behalf of our future selves and our posterity.  This is the sort of sentiment that Belarusian nationalists who desire a “European Future” possess, but it is not exclusively theirs.  Their opponents who desire a close relationship with Moscow, who see Belarus as a successor of old Rus, who appreciate orientalism or Eurasianism over westernization, also share this sentiment.  But it is a difference in value system and core belief that drives them in opposite directions.   

The nation of “Russia” is an idea, like all nations.  It is an idea of unity: a united Rus.  But as with most large countries and nations, there are undoubtably regional differences and complex politics that emerge.  Ultimately, not only can no one change the past – nobody can re-write their DNA, their lineage, their family history – but people can make political choices that fracture any hope of peace, or perhaps an advantageous unity.  Perhaps a Russophilia 2.0 might focus on creating ideas of unity and mutual respect that make a stronger argument for a united Rus, or “Russia” if you like.  This is not to say that the idea of Russia as such is flawed or fraudulent in any way.  Rather, many in Ukraine and Belarus see themselves as possessing some level of inferiority in the model of the Russian Empire, regardless of whether this inferiority was real or imagined.  One thing is certain – tying in to the idea of not being able to re-write history – one cannot change the fact that local nobility in what we now call Ukraine and Belarus became Polonized, and an argument can be made that many if not most of them had betrayed Rus, essentially becoming Poles.  The aristocracy that they were members of would eventually create the very Belarusian nationalism that we know today. 

Where did Kievan Rus go?  Is Ukraine the only successor because of geography?  Is Russia the only successor because of it’s independence from foreign rule and the throne of Moscow?  Is Belarus the only successor because it was not dominated by Mongols at some point?  When one studies East Slavic politics, ethnography, and relationships, it is impossible not to notice the presence of multiple narratives.  But which one should be subscribed to?

Belarus is left with a choice in the end, and this choice is the most salient point of this essay.  There is an argument for deep connection with the West, and there is a converse argument for deeper connection between the successors of Kievan Rus instead of the West. 

It is apparent that the west has changed in recent history, and an argument can be made that it is self-destructing.  There is an argument, even among some right wing Americans that liberalism has run its course; that what began with people like John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Thomas Paine ends inevitably with purple-haired, atheistic, social justice warriors, filled with guilt and anxiety about their ancestors, lacking love of their country and their people, and fundamentally anti-natalist.  Many in the former Russian Empire believe that the liberalism and individualism of the West make it weak; a sort of a fetid corpse of a civilization.  They see the West as a place that turned its back on its own heritage, and replaced family and nationality with ideologies, rendering it decadent and in a state of long term moral, societal decay. 

Orthodox Christians in Eastern Europe argue that not only is Western Christianity flawed, but now with the advent of Atheism and Agnosticism the common religious thought in the west is outright poisonous.  This might certainly cause pause, due to the secular history of the Soviet Union.  But the post-Soviet period is different.  The Orthodox Christian countries are on a vector of religious renewal and piety-driven social change, in ways incomparable with the secularizing west.  That vector points away from the west.  This is a critical distinction to make.  The social change in the Orthodox East is back to pre-liberal traditions.  The abortion rate, prostitution, organized crime, drug use, corruption, and other societal features that Orthodox Christianity considers to be social ills, remain rampant in places like Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.  But the difference between Russia and say, the UK, is the direction that society is headed in.  Nothing remains fixed in any country.  While problems remain in the predominantly Orthodox countries of Eastern Europe, the general direction of public and state culture has been on a mostly consistent vector back to pre-Communist traditions and culture, vector on a track of liberalism, that is off into another direction. 

Critics have claimed that the Russian Federation is somehow faking “social conservatism.”  They claim that Russia’s impending demographic crisis and a perceived need to distance the people from Western political forces has caused those in authority to create a faux social conservative/Russian Orthodox reaction to Western liberalism.  But when one considers this claim, one eventually comes to the realization that there is no faux reaction.  This is because the very act of being traditional is something real and measurable.  Either a society increasingly defines itself in Christian terms, or it does not.  It reduces its abortion rate, or it does not.  It changes its attitudes toward corruption and thievery, or it does not.  It embraces more traditional sexuality, or it does not.  It builds new churches, or it does not.  Russia, as well as the other countries of the Post-Soviet space are on a vector that consists of concrete action and change.  Belarus has had similar if not identical changes to those in Russia with regard to the Orthodox Faith, and recovering Pre-Soviet, Russian Orthodox values.

As of the 2019-2020 period of instability and spread of anti-Russian sentiments in Belarus, the country stands in the middle of a bridge, hesitating at which way to go.  Mind you, this metaphor is not referencing the government seeking to balance foreign relations, but rather the culture and lived experience of the people.  Will Belarus stay on its historical course as a Eurasian, Orthodox country?  Will it morph into a new form and join a circle of Western nations as they slowly walk off into a future rooted only as far back as what they refer to as the Enlightenment Era?  One thing is certain, and that is that Belarus seems to be undergoing a process that is not unique at all in its history.  It is certain that Belarus is a part of what is called Rus, and it is a region of Rus that borders Lithuania and Poland, through which western changes come.  The one thing that is certain is that for a long time, Belarus – the northwest of Rus – has been a region that western peoples have sought to control.  The old religion of the Latin west – Roman Catholicism – was promoted in Belarus, and now the new religion of the west – secular humanism – is promoted there.

It is a fact that the true, real, authentic, organic roots of Belarus, the true identity, the features that separate a Belarusian from a Pole or Lithuanian are from old Kievan Rus.  There is no doubt that the peasant class of that region ruled by Poland and Lithuania are indeed a different ethnicity than them, and that they have common ties with the Muscovites that go back much further.  These ties are not strictly theoretical, or just some facts of common political control prior to Lithuanian annexation of western Rus in the 14^th century, or in the Russian Empire.  They are cultural and exist in the present.  The fact that Belarusians did not have a well-developed sense of nationalism, yet were still a distinct people from their Polish and Lithuanian rulers at the time of the Partitions of Poland proves this.  Their language, old choral music, art and religion prove that Belarus and Russia are deeply tied, far beyond any modern political alliances.  Yet we are told constantly by mass media and by almost all readily available information sources outside of academia, that this is not so.